Introduction
The logical stages involved in determinative and advisory ADR decision-making include the rational gathering, analysing and considering of information, and the making and communicating of a decision. However, some of what takes place in advisory and determinative decision-making is not rational, logical or neatly divided into stages. The emphasis, approach and understanding applied to the determinative or advisory decision-making process by the parties, their representatives (if present) and the decision-maker as well as variations in the involvement and skills of all these players will determine the outcomes of the dispute resolution process. For example, at the most basic level, in gathering information, the processes used can vary according to the circumstances and can involve a decision-maker adopting a facilitative stance and using many of the techniques of introduction, understanding and questioning that are more common in mediation processes and thus influencing outcomes by enlarging the material to be gathered, reflected upon and even considered.
However, in most introductory stages of arbitral processes, there will generally be a greater focus on the technical requirements, such as the available review processes, onus of proof and legislative requirements than in other forms of decision-making. There may also be reference to the way that written material is to be used as well an explanation of bias and natural justice approaches. This framework will not import a Vulcan-like response in the arbitrator dealing with a dispute, and numerous commentators have remarked that accepting that a predominantly rationalist approach exists in respect of determinative forms of decision-making is flawed in light of the ever-expanding literature and research relating to neuroscience and cognitive perspectives. 5 In determinative processes, the information-gathering stage can be protracted and have as its focus the determination of rights rather than interests (or some other matter). Indeed in relation to judicial processes, many experienced judges indicate that in complex matters the informationgathering stage that occurs prior to any actual hearing process is essential in terms of managing process and assisting to ensure that outcomes are determined promptly. 6 However, no matter what information is being gathered, the neurobiology of the decision-maker helps to sort, store, omit, rank and at times distort information. In the later stages of determinative decision-making, both the brain and the body continue to influence how material is analysed, considered and determined. The stages are not linear in that we constantly gather, sort and analyse; however, in most determinative decision-making that is rooted in the adversarial system, the final analytical stages may occur some time after the 'in court' or 'in arbitration' gathering and sorting stages have taken place.
Gathering and Sorting
To ensure that decision-makers consider the relevant material required to make a complex decision, decision-makers, advocates and parties ask questions at each stage of a determinative hearing process. Within the formal litigation system, some aspects of the information-gathering process may be governed by practice and procedure as well as rules of evidence. In arbitration,
there is more scope to vary the information-gathering process. This is specifically mandated in more recent arbitral legislation (discussed in more detail below). However, it is increasingly the case that even within the litigation system judges are varying the way in which they gather information.
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Within the judicial context, most decision-making has been considered by judges from the perspective of the analysis of material, and there are a few significant cases that guide judges in terms of their decision-making. 
Sorting Information
In arbitral and judicial decision-making (unlike some other areas of complex decision-making), it is unusual for information to be gathered and sorted using a team problem-solving approach. It is therefore less likely that decision-makers will be challenged to perceive the information in a different manner or from a different perspective from their own. While advocates may attempt to persuade a judge or arbitrator (with varying degrees of success), it is rare for any form of distributed decision-making to take place. Essentially, the determinative decision-maker must choose one preferred approach and each advocate will advocate for their own approach. The determinative decision-maker is 'helped' to make a decision, but the options or potential outcomes are expressed in polarities.
This approach has important consequences in decision-making. For example, according to one theory, a decision-maker could (particularly if rapid decision-making is required) adopt an approach of 'take the best, ignore the rest'. 21 This means that a decision-maker weighs information quickly, makes a yes/no judgment and '… if that works, they stop and assume their inference is good enough.' 22 The adoption of this type of inferential approach may mean that information is not necessarily weighed as carefully as it might be with other more team-based approaches to decisionmaking.
There may be ways in which the information-gathering and sorting stages can better support determinative decision-makers in their analysis. For example, concurrent evidence processes can assist in decision-making in judicial as well as ADR determinative and advisory processes. Justice
McClellan, Chief Judge at Common Law of the New South Wales Supreme Court, has described the impact that concurrent evidence processes can have on the information-gathering stage, suggesting that these processes may reduce levels of tension in some circumstances. His Honour said that when these processes are used: This approach assumes that decision-making will not involve perfect information or rationality and that the behaviour of those involved in the process can be improved by using group decisional processes in some circumstances. Such processes may be helpful not only in the gathering and analytical stages but also in the 'sorting stage.' In this regard, group or team approaches could be used to discourage a sorting 'bias' (see below).
One particular and related issue in the sorting stage is how we may ignore, distort or reject information because of conscious and unconscious bias. To prevent bias in the informationgathering and sorting stages, Feigenson and Park suggest a four-step process to reduce or eliminate emotional bias: 24 1. Be aware of the unwanted influence.
2. Be motivated to correct the bias.
3. Be aware of the magnitude and direction of the bias.
4. Be able to adjust the response accordingly.
They also suggest that simply being aware of a person's accountability for a decision 'will attenuate the effect of incidental emotional influence on decision-making'. proper influence upon judicial decision-making, and to remind all judges of the need to stand outside themselves and to question their own certainties.'
26
Another approach may require a rethinking of systemic approaches (rather than individual approaches) to judging. The material on group decision-making suggests that the impact of belief systems might be minimised if groups, rather than individuals, are involved in sorting at least in complex cases or disputes. This is an interesting notion given that most arbitrators work alone, and even if they work together (for example, in a panel environment), they may not necessarily share the sorting activity (although they may share the writing up of a decision).
One significant and contentious change in the commercial arbitration area is related to the ability of arbitrators to adopt a 'med-arb' model, which may impact upon the processes used to sort information and therefore the quality of the decisions made. While the new provision may, on the one hand, increase the likelihood of an abuse of natural justice and increase the risk of bias, it may on the other hand create a different and potentially more collaborative decision-making environment -a group decision-making environment. However, the changes also support the need for a more careful review of bias issues.
Neurobiology and Decision-making
Clearly, decision-making is a complex process. Recent research on neurobiology and neuroawareness suggests that information-gathering and decision-making are likely to be governed by different parts of the brain and may be influenced by factors that are neither rational nor logical. Using a conceptual model of brain function, it seems that many different brain areas are involved in decision-making (summarised below in tabular form and partly taken from Bennett and Broe) 31 and in the information-gathering stage.
We constantly sort, ignore and add information before analysing, and our analytical processes are also individual and linked to our individual brain structure and processes. An injury to one part of the brain or alcohol and substance abuse can have more impact on some regions than others. In addition, as most cognitive processes occur simultaneously, if brain connectivity is harmed, overall brain function may be reduced. Considering these activities from a brain specialisation perspective, the areas of the brain involved in the decisional processes are set out below: This approach to brain specialisation also supports the notion that the conscious and unconscious brain are intertwined with a simultaneous reaction and response. However, many theorists suggest that the unconscious brain is more powerful than the conscious part as it:
 has a vast implicit memory system; 36  has a higher processing capacity and can absorb data more quickly;
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 can converse with all parts of the body and undertake complex tasks without thinking (for example, being able to drive a car after learning the task);
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 is better at solving problems with many variables.
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This suggests that in the race to make a decision, the unconscious brain is more likely to dominate or at least trigger the primary response. However, reason, which is acquired through study and the development of reasoning and analytical skills, helps the brain to make 'good decisions' that involve more careful risk calculation (that the unconscious parts of the brain may not support).
Reasoning
Clearly, brain structures have an impact on the information-gathering and sorting process, but how do they have an impact on reasoning? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider reasoning processes and how sensibility can conquer sense. Reasoning is generally defined as the processes by 36 See H Roediger, (September 1990 reasoning is the logical reasoning that enables us to draw a conclusion from a set of assumptions based on logical rules. Although deductive reasoning suggests that a decision-maker will be logical, there is much research to show that the content of problems influences how they are solved.
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Another form of reasoning is analogical reasoning; essentially, we understand a new situation by relating it to a familiar situation.
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When dealing with problem-solving or undertaking a reasoning process, there are some significant barriers to rational decision-making. These can be described as:
 Functional fixedness -the tendency to rely on data or methodologies that have worked in the past even when alternatives may work more effectively.
 Confirmation bias -the tendency to search for confirmation of what is already believed.
 Heuristic systems -essentially cognitive shortcuts where similarity matching is used to infer an outcome.
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The work on reasoning suggests that reasoning is essentially the struggle between sense and sensibility, the unconscious and the conscious, and that our deductive, analogical reasoning processes must be tested in the decision-making process. The 'balancing act' that is reasoned judging assists the conscious brain to assess risk, while the unconscious brain attempts to hijack it by manipulating the information it receives and sorts. Reasoning requires us to be aware of the 'spark' Personal qualities can impact on 'decisiveness' and reasoning capacity. Clearly, a person's decisiveness and reasoning capacity is not only linked to brain structure and connectivity, but also to other innate factors and is a product of learned and other experiences. Some people may require a lot of detailed information to make a decision, while others may require less. Some discuss the options available with colleagues or others. Cultural factors in terms of individual and group decision-making might also be relevant in relation to how completely options and alternatives need to be explored and framed. This is important as the quality of the decision is a matter that is largely determined by those who are affected by it. A clearly reasoned and well-thought decision may, for
example, be open to criticism or invite an appeal if it is imperfectly or clumsily framed.
Decision-making and Conveying a Decision
There has been some recent work on the 'framing' of decisions that reviews how decisions or options are expressed. Much of this work has been considered in the context of cognitive heuristics, 46 and there has been limited work in the decisional domain. Sharp described the 1981 study by Tversky and Kahneman that demonstrated how normatively inconsequential changes in the statement of a problem dramatically affect preferences and choices. 47 Tversky and Kahneman provided two groups of subjects with the following scenario based on a hypothetical outbreak of a rare disease that was expected to kill 600 people: both groups were told that two alternative programs were being considered to deal with the outbreak and asked which they preferred. The alternatives provided to group 1 were framed as follows:
(a) If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved; or (b) If program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that all will be saved and a two-thirds probability that none will be saved.
Of the 158 respondents in group 1, 76 per cent chose program A. In contrast, group 2's alternatives were framed as follows:
If program A is adopted, 400 people will die; or (b) If program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that no one will die and a two-thirds probability that all will die. Of the 169 respondents in group 2, only 13 per cent chose program A.
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The work on framing, anchoring and expressing options and outcomes therefore suggests that decision-makers may support greater uptake of options and compliance with decisions if they express outcomes by referring to:
 award rather than loss;
 assessing alternatives and both the positive and negative implications of each.
This work also suggests that good decision-making may also involve 'good framing' and a closer analysis of what framing is more likely to support compliance with outcomes. Work on anchoring and heuristics is also relevant in the broader ADR environment as it suggests that it is more likely that lower or higher outcomes will be accepted or adopted if the brain is primed to accept them.
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Other work on framing suggests that information about a process as well as information about options and outcomes will all impact on compliance with outcomes as well as the outcomes that are reached. This work has implications for all forms of dispute resolution and supports the giving of procedural explanations throughout an ADR process (this can prime disputants to provide higher quality information) as well as ensuring that outcomes are canvassed before the conclusion of the dispute resolution process.
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Future Decision-making determinative dispute resolvers make decisions and can be linked back to the overarching objectives of the particular form of the decision-making. For example, objectives that relate to conventional adjudication emphasise the importance of precedent setting and the development of law. These objectives can be contrasted with broader objectives: will the decision be effective (complied with) or will the decision promote respect for the arbitral system? It may be that 'blended' adjudicative processes can meet these objectives more readily than traditional adjudicative processes, because there is an active consideration of issues relating to how the decision is made and communicated (rather than only considering whether or not the decision is 'right').
The objectives of any decision-making processes play an important role in framing the neurobiological responses to those processes. They create a broader framework within which dispute information is sorted, questioned and analysed. Procedural explanations by those involved in determinative and advisory processes are critical in helping to ensure that this work is undertaken in an orderly and effective manner. These explanations also help arbitrators and all participants to engage appropriately and promote the more logical gathering and sorting of information. However, even when these frameworks are in place, innate, learned and situational factors will impact on decision-making processes. Much of this article has considered these neurobiological issues from the perspective of rational and irrational thinking responses; and it is clear that sometimes these individual factors will enable the brain to be hijacked and resist rational decision-making.
